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SPEECHES
JUDICIAL SKEPTICISM AND THE
THREAT OF TERRORISM
THE HONORABLE ROBERT

D.

SACK*

Chief Judge Jacobs; Second Circuit colleagues; judges; mem
bers of the Council, its Board and staff; law clerks past and present;
other family, friends, and guests. I am overwhelmed by this award
bearing the name of Learned Hand. If there were no such word as
"vertiginous," I would have to invent it now.
I would like to spend a few minutes talking with you about the
role of judges. What better place to begin than with our real
honoree tonight, Judge Hand. Hand counseled individual modesty.
He quoted, although perhaps a bit out of context, Oliver Crom
well's plea: "'I beseech ye in the bowels of Christ, think that ye may
be mistaken.'''1 And more famously, while World War II continued
to rage and to devastate, while Western Europe was still in the grip
of the Nazis, he invoked the spirit of liberty; "the spirit," he said,
"which is not too sure that it is right; ... the spirit which seeks to
understand the minds of other men and women."2
Hand also spoke of the limited nature of the judicial role. In
an opinion, he put it this simply: "[O]urs is only to apply the law as

* United States Circuit Judge for the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. These
are Judge Sack's remarks upon receipt of the Learned Hand Award for Excellence in
Federal Jurisprudence, which was awarded to him by the Federal Bar Council in 2008.
1. THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 229 (Ir
ving Dilliard ed., 2d ed. 1953) [hereinafter THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY].
2. Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty (May 21, 1944), in THE SPIRIT OF LIB
ERTY, supra note 1, at 190.
1
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we find it."3 About opinions, he said: "[A]fter all, we are not
speaking to eternity, but deciding disputes."4 Just so. The judge's
role is limited and passive: deciding disputes, and, in doing so, find
ing what the law is and applying it.
Not to say that what judges do is unimportant. For without a
system of judging that works, the unmediated friction among the
opposing forces of everyday life would likely reduce us to a society
of warlords, chaos, or both.
The Framers were well aware of the confined nature of the job
they gave us to do-even the Supreme Court may do no more than
decide "cases and controversies."5 They nonetheless saw the need
that a coequal branch of government be written into the Constitu
tion to perform that function.
The Second Circuit sits in the shadow of the ghost of the World
Trade Center. My chambers are within the outer security perimeter
of New York Police Headquarters and its counter-terrorism force.
We are keenly aware that not a day goes by when members of the
third branch do not address issues arising from or associated in one
way or another with the horrors of September 11, 2001. It is not
always easy. It requires us, for example, to indulge in occasional
special measures of secrecy and security. As stewards of open pub
lie courts we are, as we should be, uncomfortable with those mea
sures. But it is our job and we do it. Some of our colleagues on the
district court do it with what seems to me to be conspicuous
bravery.
This is an age of anxiety, then, but it is not the first time in
living memory that we have had reason to be fearful. In the late
1940s, as a schoolchild, I participated in mandatory shelter-area
drills. It is still not clear to me how ducking beneath our pine desks
would have protected us from the blast and fallout of a Soviet
atomic bomb. But we did what we were told to do.
In the midst of this post-war Soviet menace, Judge Hand wrote
the opinion for the Second Circuit in United States v. Dennis. 6 The
defendants had been convicted for willfully and knowingly conspir
3. United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 234 (2d Cir. 1950), affd, 341 U.S. 494
(1951).
4. Letter from Learned Hand to Robert G. Simmons, Chief Justice, Nebraska
Supreme Court (May 25, 1940), in GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN
AND THE JUDGE 528 (1994).
5. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
6. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201.
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ing to organize the Communist Party of the United States.7 Ac
cording to the indictment, in violation of the Smith Act, they taught
and advocated the overthrow of the government by force. 8 The
Second Circuit affirmed the convictions. 9
Judge Hand analyzed the application of the clear and present
danger test for the Court. lO He famously concluded that '''clear
and present danger' depends upon whether the mischief of the re
pression is greater than the gravity of the evil, discounted by its
improbability."ll Not uncontroversial to this day.
The point for tonight, though, lies elsewhere in that decision.
Hand recounted in some detail the dangers that international com
munism then posed. "By far the most powerful of all the European
nations," he wrote, "ha[s] been a convert to Communism for over
thirty years; its leaders [are] the most devoted and potent propo
nents of the faith. "12 He went on,
Any border fray, any diplomatic incident, any difference in con
struction of the modus vivendi-such as the Berlin blockade ...
might prove a spark in the tinder-box, and lead to war. We do
not understand, how one could ask for a more probable danger,
unless we must wait till the actual eve of hostilities. 13

But that raised the question: who would decide "whether the
mischief of the repression [of the defendants' speech was indeed]
greater than the gravity of [its] evil, discounted by its improbabil
ity"?14 The courts, he said, even at that time of national peril. "In
application of such a standard courts may strike a wrong balance,"
he wrote. IS But, "[a]bdication is as much a failure of duty, as indif
ference is a failure to protect primal rights. "16

***

The 1960s and early 70s were no less apocalyptic. In 1962,
there were Soviet missiles in Cuba capable of carrying nuclear war
heads to much of the American mainland. It was also the time of
the mistreatment and murder of civil rights workers, the assassina
7.
8.
9.

10.
11.
12.

13.
14.
15.

16.

Id. at 205.
Id.
Id. at 234.
Id. at 209.
Id. at 215.
Id. at 213.
Id.
Id. at 215.
Id. at 212.
Id.
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tions of President John F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr., the
immolation of American inner cities, the war in Vietnam, and the
resulting bitter divisions at home. To borrow Judge Gurfein's un
derstated phrase from his Pentagon Papers decision, "troubled
times."17
In many ways, that era ended with the 1974 resignation of Pres
ident Richard Nixon. His successor, Gerald Ford, referred to the
events that led to the resignation as "our long national
nightmare."18 It was the culmination of a historic confrontation be
tween Congress and the executive branch. But central to those
events was the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Nixon 19 -the tapes case. Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski had
subpoenaed tape recordings of White House conversations among
the President and his aides. 20 He sought them as evidence against
seven former presidential associates in Watergate-related prosecu
tions. 21 The district court ordered the President to turn over the
tapes to it for review. 22 He resisted, asserting executive privilege. 23
The President's lawyers pointed out to the Supreme Court that this
was an intra-branch dispute-federal prosecutor against United
States President. 24 They urged that the judiciary had no role to
play,2s
Speaking for an undivided Supreme Court, Chief Justice Bur
ger rejected the argument. 26 The evidence, he said,
is sought by one official of the Executive Branch within the scope
of his express authority; it is resisted by the Chief Executive on
the ground of his duty to preserve the confidentiality of the com
munications of the President. Whatever the correct answer on
the merits, these issues are "of a type which are traditionally
justiciable. "27
17. United States v. New York Times Co. (Pentagon Papers), 328 F. Supp. 324,
331 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd per curiam, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
18. Remarks on Taking the Oath of Office, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2 (Aug. 9, 1974).
19. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
20. Id. at 687-88.
21. Id. at 687.
22. Id. at 686.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 692.
25. /d. at 692-93.
26. Id. at 697.
27. Id. (quoting United States v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 337 U.S. 426, 430
(1949)).

2009]

JUDICIAL SKEPTICISM AND THE THREAT OF TERRORISM

5

The issues were therefore "controversies" for the courts, and only
the courts, under Article IIU8
The Court decided that the President had no blanket executive
privilege under the circumstances. 29 He was required to turn the
tapes over to the district court in camera for its determination as to
their relevance. 3o And largely because of the so-called "smoking
gun" tape then disclosed, within three weeks, the President left
office.
In Nixon, the Court noted that national security was not at is
31
sue. It is, therefore, unclear how it would have treated the claim
of executive privilege had national security concerns been asserted.
But the Court's approach seems to me entirely inconsistent with the
notion that, had the President's lawyers only thought to say "na
tional security," the Supreme Court WOUld, for these purposes, have
closed its doors.
To bring you to the present day, I would like to draw a parallel
for you between Dennis, Nixon, and a recent case in our court. 32
To get there, though, I have to proffer a brief disclaimer. My col
league Judge Cabranes has referred to me-affectionately, I
hope-as a "voluptuary of the First Amendment." Fair enough. I
spent most of my time in practice as a so-called "media lawyer."
That's an understatement. To say you were a media lawyer when
you represented The Wall Street Journal, as I did, is a little like say
ing you just had a glass of merlot when in fact you were sipping
Chateau Petrus. But okay, I was a media lawyer.
Because of my background, I turn now to a press case by way
of illustration with some trepidation. I am not talking tonight about
the press particularly or perhaps at all. My subject is the courts.
In 1970, John Mitchell's Department of Justice ("DOJ" or
"Department") promulgated departmental guidelines for its deci
sions as to when and under what circumstances it would subpoena
members of the news media. The guidelines exist today substan

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
418 U.S.
(1951).

Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
Nixon, 418 U.S. at 713.
Id. at 714.
Id. at 706.
New York Times Co. v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Nixon,
683; United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), affd, 341 U.S. 494
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tially in that form. 33 And in 2006, a panel of our court decided a
case touching on them. 34
The Department was seeking the source of "leaks" to New
York Times reporters. 35 The sources had tipped off the Times
about impending raids on organizations suspected of channeling fi
nancial support to terrorists. 36 The question was whether the gov
ernment could subpoena the reporters' phone records from third
party telephone companies to identify the sources. 37 The prosecu
tors assured the district court that the Mitchell-era guidelines had
been met,38 They urged this as an end to the matter; Judge Sweet
thought it was not. Citing to existing qualified legal protection for
such sources, he concluded that the prosecution had not established
that the qualifications had been met. 39
A majority of a Second Circuit panel on which I sat dis
agreed. 40 It concluded that whatever legal protection there may be
for such sources, it is conditional. The majority thought that
whatever the conditions, they had indeed been satisfied. I, on the
other hand, thought they had not been, and therefore voted, in dis
sent, to affirm the judgment of the district court. 41
It seemed to me, though, as I wrote at the time, that "the ques
tion at the heart of th[e] appeal [was] not so much whether there
[was] protection for the identity of reporters' sources, or even what
that protection [was], but [rather] which branch of government de
cides whether, when, and how any such protection is overcome."42
And as to that, I then said, I thought the panel unanimous in the
view "that the executive branch of government [does not have] that
sort of wholly unsupervised authority to police the limits of its own
power under these circumstances. "43 I quoted a concurring opinion
of Judge Tatel in a not dissimilar case in the D.C. Circuit. 44 "[T]he
33. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2008).
34. See New York Times Co., 459 F.3d 160.
35. New York TImes Co. v. Gonzalez, 382 F. Supp. 2d 457, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2005),
vacated, 459 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2006).
36. Id. at 466.
37. Id. at 464.
38. Id. at 480-81.
39. Id. at 484-513 (including protections under the First Amendment and federal
common law).
40. New York Times Co., 459 F.3d 160.
41. Id. at 174 (Sack, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 175.
43. Id. at 177.
44. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1175 (D.C. Cir.
2006).
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executive branch," he said, "possesses no special expertise that
would justify judicial deference to prosecutors' judgments about the
relative magnitude of First Amendment interests. Assessing those
interests traditionally falls within the competence of courts. "45
Even, he might have added, in a nation under continuous threat of
attack.
Tension between the government and the press about whether
and how to enable journalists to continue effectively to assure
source confidentiality continues. The Senate Judiciary Committee
has been considering a statute not terribly unlike the DOJ guide
lines. 46 Because it would be law, though, it would be enforceable in
the courts.
Several months ago, I received from a fine editor, old friend,
and former client an e-mail containing a statement by the Attorney
General of the United States. On behalf of other intelligence and
law enforcement agencies and the DOJ, the Attorney General had
testified against the source protection bill. 47 Referring to the DOJ
guidelines, the Attorney General said:
Under the current system, [those] guidelines determine in any
specific case whether it is appropriate to issue a subpoena to a
reporter. These internal guidelines provide a series of standards
and checklists, including my specific approval, before any re
porter is subpoenaed.... [U]nder the Media Shield bill, even in
an investigation of a past terrorist attack the bill would have a
judge decide whether the Department's need for the information
... outweighs the "public interest" in the free flow of informa
tion. No standard for decision is provided in the bill. But even if
one views these factors as capable of being balanced, this is not a
determination that can reasonably be asked of a judge, particu
larly in cases involving national security.48

Back in 1974, when I was literally half my age, I was a member
of the House Judiciary Committee impeachment inquiry staff. In
light of that experience and those memories, when I heard the At
torney General's 2008 reference to Executive Branch leaks, I
thought of the Nixon White House and its Special Investigation
45. Id. at 1175-76; see also New York Times Co., 459 F.3d at 177.
46. Oversight of the U.S. Department of Justice, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 110th Congo 21-22 (2008) (statement of Michael B. Mukasey, Att'y Gen.
of the United States), available at http://online.wsj.comlpubliclresources/documents/
MukaseyStatement20080128.pdf.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 22.
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Unit. They were called the "Plumbers," as you know, because their
job was to plug leaks from the Executive Branch. 49 When I then
saw, in the same paragraph of the Attorney General's testimony,
the phrase "national security," I thought myself listening again to
the March 21, 1973, Oval Office tape. 50 The discussion was about
how, in light of the fallout from the break-in at The Watergate, the
White House could explain one of the Plumbers' operations-the
break-in at the office of Daniel Elsberg's former psychiatrist. I can
still hear President Nixon saying: "No, seriously, National security.
We had to get information for national security grounds. "51 The
magic words: "National security."
I do not mean for a moment to suggest that 2008 is 1973 again.
These times are not those times; these people are not those people.
I have vast regard for the Attorney General, another old friend and
a former partner. I told the Judiciary Committee vetting my nomi
nation in 1998 that he was the active judge whom I most admired
significantly because of his handling of national security cases.
As I understand him, though, he is saying that the Department
of Justice has long appreciated that there is a conflict here between
critical interests of law enforcement and the press. But to protect
the nation against terrorism, not only should Congress not make a
law on the subject, but judges have no role to play. The DOJ will
pass the law protecting sources and decide cases and controversies
under it by itself, thank you all the same.
If that is so-if such disputes must be decided not by judges
but by the prosecutors themselves according to their own rules
then I think the Attorney General is telling us that here, our system
does not work. He may be right! But I think that the presumption
is otherwise-that judges decide such disputes. The nation's chief
law enforcement officer must, I submit, make a substantial and per
suasive showing to overcome that presumption.
The judicial role is largely passive, as I've said. It's modest.
But when that modest and passive role seems to be impinged upon,
we have James Madison to contend with. "[T]he great security
against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same
department," he said, "consists in giving to those who administer
49. JIM HOUGAN, SECRET AGENDA 36 (1984).
50. TRANSCRIPT OF A RECORDING OF A MEETING AMONG THE PRESIDENT, JOHN
DEAN, AND H.R. HALDEMAN IN THE OVAL OFFICE, ON MARCH 21, 1973, FROM 10:12
TO 11:55 AM, at 73, available at http://www.nixonlibrary.gov/forresearchers/findltapes/
watergate/trial/exhibiC12.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2009).
51. Id.
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each department, the necessary constitutional means, and personal
motives, to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for
defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to
the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract
ambition. "52
As I've noted, we judges do little more than resolve disputes
"of a type which are traditionally justiciable," and in doing so, we
interpret and apply the law. But, paradoxically, Madison expected
us to insist, as Judge Hand and Justice Burger did, that it is we and
not a co-equal branch that will, with carefully considered excep
tions, make those decisions in light of the law as we understand it to
be. One of the lessons is Hand's, perhaps echoing Madison: "[I]f
we are to be saved it must be through skepticism."53 "Skepticism."
Perhaps Hand's favorite theme.
In the Nixon tapes case, Chief Justice Burger said for the Su
preme Court,
Notwithstanding the deference each branch must accord the
others, the "judicial Power of the United States" vested in the
federal courts by Art. III, § 1, of the Constitution can no more be
shared with the Executive Branch than the Chief Executive, for
example, can share with the JUdiciary the veto power, or the
Congress share with the Judiciary the power to override a Presi
dential veto. 54

I think, then, that if another branch says that it is not for us to
decide a traditionally justiciable dispute, that branch must explain
very clearly and very persuasively why not. We must be skeptical of
any such claim. I have done my own electronic search of the Feder
alist Papers and can find nowhere in them the phrase, "Trust me."
I am reminded finally of something that predated Hand and
Burger by some two thousand years. My father frequently quoted
Rabbi Hillel's familiar exhortation. In my father's translation it is:
If I am not for myself, who will be for me? If I am only for myself,
what am I? If not now, when?55 If we judges do not use our skepti
cism in protecting our role under the Constitution, who will defend
it? As Hillel said, "[W]ho will be for [US]?"56 If we do so reflex
52. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
53. THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY, supra note 1, at xxv.
54. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
55. See Jewish Virtual Library, Hillel and Shammai, http://www.jewishvirtual
library.orgljsourcelbiography/hillel.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2009).
56. Id.
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ively, single-mindedly, ambitiously, if we act as no more than one
side in a controversy, we are not acting as judges. We fail ourselves
and our mission. Like Hillel, we must ask, what are we?
Most important, perhaps, insofar as the manifold challenges we
now face call for a firm and effective response by the national gov
ernment, it is the national government that must respond; not one
of its branches. The need for a vigorous judiciary to address the
mostly difficult, sometimes divisive cases and controversies that
arise is, at this trying time, undiminished. Rabbi Hillel said, "[I]f
not now, when?"57 In this context, perhaps, now more than ever.
I thank you all.

57.

Id.

